This report proposes a framework for integrating corporate value creation with societal outcomes, arguing that long-term business success depends on healthy economic, social, and environmental systems. It calls on companies to align strategy, governance, and performance measurement with broader system impacts, moving beyond short-term financial metrics toward shared value creation. 

This commentary argues that rising authoritarianism represents a material risk to investors by undermining rule of law, regulatory stability, and democratic institutions. It explores how political systems influence capital markets and suggests investors and companies must incorporate governance and democracy risks into investment analysis.

The Equitable Bank Standards define a comprehensive framework for banks across five areas: governance, lending and investments, products and services, operational practices, and corporate citizenship. They lay out concrete standards for maximizing positive social and environmental impact while minimizing harm, guiding bankers, regulators, advocates, and customers in assessing whether finance advances equity and community well-being.

This empirical study examines how green energy investment, innovation capacity, and political stability jointly drive sustainable economic growth across OECD countries. It finds that institutional stability and governance quality significantly amplify the economic returns of environmental investment, reinforcing the link between political systems and green competitiveness. 

This article examines two methods for pricing carbon – the first based on estimating the “social cost of carbon” for current and future generations, and the second based on mandating limits and using a permit system to meet them. Argues for a fixed limit based on tipping points, and points to the challenges of political coordination required to adopt it, and the potential for technology to make that easier.

This article distinguishes between pro-market policies that enhance competition – so businesses that create value are rewarded -- and pro-business policies that favor specific businesses or industries. It argues that government favoritism distorts competition, undermines innovation, reduces opportunity and weakens democratic accountability, urging policymakers to prioritize competitive neutrality and institutional integrity over industry capture. 

Why this resource matters 
It reflects CPR’s Responsibility principle, calling for businesses to “champion   healthy market “rules of the game” that foster competition on the basis of quality, price and long-term value, minimizing costs externalized to other stakeholders and aligning private interests with the broader public good.” 

This article argues that firms are significant political as well as economic actors, with considerable power to shape the rules of the game within which they compete. Fillling in the gap in the prevailing theory of the firm, which ignores the elements of politics and power, Zingales outlines the risk of a “Medici vicious circle,” and how this risk depends on several non-market factors.  He develops a framework for understanding corporate political behavior as endogenous to market systems, emphasizing how firms influence governance structures, competition, and distributional outcomes.